Monkey frontal cortex harbours cells that fire both when a monkey performs object-directed actions and when he views similar actions being made by an experimenter (or another monkey). 1, 2 The majority of these cells, called 'mirror neurones', are rather specific for the type of movement they react to. Their firing reflects subject-object interactions and can be linked for example to grasping movements of the hand, or to manipulation or prehension movements, but they do not fire if the experimenter simulates the movement without any object. The mirror neurones reside in the so-called area F5 in the frontal lobe, which is extensively connected to the parietal cortex. Not surprisingly, neurones with similar reactivity to visually presented movements as the mirror neurones exist in the supra-temporal cortex. However, these neurones do not fire during motor activity, and many of the frontal mirror neurones fire even if the monkey moves in complete darkness. Therefore the mirror neurones appear to form a unique link between action execution and action observation ('monkey see, monkey do' cells 3 ). Does anything similar to the monkey 'mirror system' exist in humans? At least two lines of evidence support such a conjecture. Functional neuroimaging with positron emission tomography has revealed increased blood flow in Brocas area during action observation. 4, 5 Interestingly, there is evidence that Brocas area is the human homologue of monkey F5. This has led to the hypothesis that monkey mirror neurones may have been important in the development of language 6 and that language may have developed from oro-facial and brachio-manual gestures. Evidence for a human homologue to the monkey mirror system also comes from a transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS) study, 7 which showed that TMS-evoked motor potentials are facilitated when a human subject views the performance of hand movements. The facilitation occurred only in the muscles that would have been involved if the subject had performed the observed actions! How is this facilitation caused? Could it result from the prefrontal motor Correspondence: Dr S Salenius, Brain Research Unit, Low Temperature Laboratory, Helsinki University of Technology, Otakaari 3A, PO Box 2200, FIN-02015, Finland. E-mail: stephanȰneuro. hut.fi areas influencing the spinal level or could even the primary motor cortex be involved? Having previously shown that the primary motor cortex (M1) is activated during motor imagery, 8 we set out to specifically test the hypothesis of M1 activation during action observation with whole-scalp magnetoencephalography (MEG). 9 MEG measures the very weak magnetic fields that arise from cortical currents, and in many ways resembles its better-known older sister electroencephalography (EEG) although some significant differences also exist. 10 An advantage of MEG over EEG is that magnetic fields are not significantly distorted by the skull and scalp whereas especially the high electric resistance of the skull results in a smearing of cerebral electric potentials measured on the scalp. It is therefore in most cases easier to estimate the underlying source configurations on the basis of MEG than EEG data. The whole-scalp magnetometer we used houses 122 SQUID (Supraconducting QUantum Interference Device) gradiometers in a helmet-shaped array, immersed in liquid helium.
We utilised an experimental paradigm which capitalises on the fact that median nerve stimulation evokes a burst of rhythmic activity of about 20 Hz which arises mainly from the primary motor hand area. [11] [12] [13] Suppression of this burst, either totally or in part, indicates activation of M1. Our subjects either rested relaxed, manipulated a small object with their right hand or viewed the experimenter making similar manipulation movements. As expected, motor cortex activity showed a rebound after median nerve stimulation, which was abolished by simultaneous manipulation movements. Most important, mere viewing of similar movements also significantly diminished the rebound (Figure 1 ), although electromyogram recordings revealed no muscle activity. A control experiment showed that although viewing a dot moving randomly within a virtual rectangle also induced a reduction of motor cortex activity, this reduction was significantly smaller than the one induced by viewing manipulation movements.
These results support the existence of an action execution/observation system in humans and suggest that the primary motor cortex is a part of this system. Monkey recordings have not revealed neurones in M1 that alter their firing rate in association with action observation; however, MEG recordings reflect changes in neural synchrony and are not necessarily associated with changes in neuronal firing rates. Motor cortex activity is reduced also during motor imagery. 6 Were the subjects thus involved in imagery during viewing of the manipulation movements? Probably not because, in contrast to the results for action viewing, weak but significant electromyogram activity was detected during the motor imagery experiments. However, the comparison between motor imagery and action viewing is interesting, one way of conceptualising the difference might be as a difference between voluntary and involuntary motor simulation.
As mentioned above the mirror system has given rise to speculation on the evolutionary history of language acquisition. However, from a psychiatric point of view, an even more interesting speculation is that the mirror system could be critically involved in interpreting the actions of other agents, 'reading their mind', or at least represent a primitive variant, perhaps a phylogenetic precursor, of such a capacity.
14 Mind reading requires the representing of mental states of others, ie, goals, expectations, beliefs etc (a 'theory of mind'), and enables prediction of an agent's future actions and behavioural adaptation to these anticipated actions. According to one view of mind reading, it involves constructing a theory about the behaviour of others invoking general rules to explain and predict their behaviour. Mind reading would thus involve more theoretical reasoning than 'empathic understanding'. Such a theory would not predict the existence of a system matching action execution and observation in humans. However, the existence of such a system fits well with the so-called 'simulation theory of mind', which posits that we interpret other agents' actions, at least in part, by simulating their behaviour internally. The simulation allows us to predict the actions of others but also to retrodict them, ie, to infer what mental states might have resulted in the observed actions. This resembles the activity of a psychotherapist who observes his reactions to a client and tries to infer information about the mental states of the client based on these reactions, although mirror neurones in monkeys do not appear to be sensitive to the emotional meaning of the observed actions. In any case, not only our perceptual cerebral machinery but also our motor system, even M1, appears to be involved in monitoring our environment; we appear to 'understand' movements by simulating them internally.
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